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Introduction
Winston Churchill wrote in an American magazine in 1930, “The
conception of a United States of Europe is right. Every step taken to that end…,
which encourages nations to lay aside their precautionary panoply, is good in
itself.” (Young 10) This statement predated any movement towards an
institutionalized Europe by 20 years. Ironically enough, it also came from the
leader of a member state that would later be skeptical to join Europe and currently
is experiencing some calls to leave the European Union.
The United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973.
Two years later the British government held a referendum concerning their
membership in the institution. The country voted in favor by a nearly 2:1 vote.
Since then, however, the support for the European Union within the United
Kingdom consistently declined, and only 26% of the surveyed citizens think the
European Union is a good thing (Eurobarometer). The Euroskepticism in the
United Kingdom partially led to a proposed referendum in October 2011 from the
Conservative Party to either renegotiate the United Kingdom’s terms of
membership in the European Union, remain as is or consider leaving.
I will be attempting to answer two questions: why has support for an
integrated Europe always been lower in the United Kingdom than other nations
and why is support declining in the United Kingdom for European
supranationalism. While support in other countries for the European Union has
also been lower than the average of the EU27, my study focuses on the United
Kingdom solely.
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To answer my first question of why support has always been lower in the
UK, I will look at theories that attempt to explain why individuals have varying
levels of support for the European Union and other supranational institutions. I
will take some of these theories and expand them to try and explain why some
nations support the European Union more than others, and more specifically
applying to the United Kingdom: cognitive ability, especially pertaining to
education; economic welfare; materialism vs. post-materialism; partisanship; and
factors involving the nation’s history. None of these theories fully explains the
Euroskpticism in the United Kingdom, and even together it is difficult to provide
a concrete explanation for why support for the EU in the United Kingdom
dropped so much.
The United Kingdom has distinguished itself from the rest of the European
Union in regard to support for membership. The United Kingdom, however, is
not the only nation to exhibit a distrust and distaste for European integration. For
example, Latvia currently has 25% of its citizens believing the EU is a good thing
according to the Eurobarometer, similar to the United Kingdom’s 26%. However,
no other country has initiated anything like the United Kingdom’s 2011
referendum. Possibly the best explanation is the experience of the United
Kingdom in the 1940s, which no other European Union nation shared. The
United Kingdom emerged from World War II not quite as demolished as the rest
of Europe, as well as learned the lesson that they do not need to rely on the rest of
Europe for security. This difference in experience could be what is setting them
apart from the rest of the EU and distancing some citizens from the concept of
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integration. I test this by comparing the differences between the United Kingdom
and other European countries after World War II.
As for the second question of why is support for the European Union is
declining, I argue that the European Union of today is not the institution the
United Kingdom joined in 1973. The EEC was a much looser economic union,
mainly concerning the common market. The European institutions of the 1950s
primarily concerned development of the common European market and the
political and social policies came later. With each additional treaty, the EEC
evolved into an institution that the United Kingdom, as well as most of Europe,
does not feel as favorably towards. The EU may be over reaching its original
intentions and becoming an institution that many nations may not want to be a
part of. I test this by looking at the changes in the European Union over the years
and argue that these changes in the EU are the primary reason support is
declining.
Decline in support for the European Union could make the future of
Europe difficult to predict. While the union itself will likely stay together, the
euro and European policies may change drastically. I do believe that it would
take something major for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, but
renegotiation of membership may not be far in the future.
My study begins with the referendum in 2011, then moves to contrast with
the original referendum on membership in 1975. Along with the next section on
the history of the United Kingdom and the European Union, this lays the
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groundwork for examining the conditions in the United Kingdom that might have
caused this decline in support. From there, I examine the decline in membership
in not only the United Kingdom, but the EU27 average as well. This proves
lower support in the United Kingdom as well as the decline in overall support for
the European institutions over time. I then attempt to explain why the United
Kingdom has always been lower in support for the European Union than other
European countries using four theories on individual membership expanded to a
country level. After those theories, I address the loss of empire and different
experience the United Kingdom had in World War II. Finally, I look at the
changes in the European Union from a loose economic union to an institution that
also includes social policies and politics that may be making the United Kingdom
decline in support over time.

Page | 7

Part I: Referendums on Membership
October 2011 Referendum
While the whole of Europe is experiencing a decline in support for the
European Union and its institutions, the proposed referendum in October 2011
sets the United Kingdom apart from the rest of Europe. There had not been a
referendum on this matter in the 36 years since the 1975 decision regarding the
United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union. However, as shown in
the previous chapter, the public opinion regarding the EU and its institutions has
been radically changing. The United Kingdom and its population is not the same
as it was in 1975. Also given the changing opinions clearly seen in the
Eurobarometer polls, the same vote that happened in 1975 might not be the same
vote as would be now. The Eurobarometer is a collection of surveys issued by the
European Commission to gauge the citizens’ opinions of Europe. This is just the
climate the Eurosceptics needed.
An increase in Euroskepticism coupled with a decline in support for the
European Union laid the foundation for the referendum in 2011. Surprisingly
enough, the proposal of a referendum on EU membership came out of the
Conservative Party. Nuttal proposed a non-binding referendum in which the MPs
vote on their opinions of British membership in the European Union. The
purpose of this referendum would be to determine if future action was needed to
reassess the United Kingdom’s relationship with Europe. Nuttall proposed three
options for the outcome of the vote: to leave the EU; stay in the EU as is; or to
renegotiate their terms of membership.

Page | 8

Prime Minister David Cameron was starkly against a referendum of this
kind. He enraged many Eurosceptics claiming that the institution in Brussels is
doing “useful work” on managing poverty and climate change. Cameron has also
stated that a referendum is not in the Conservative Party’s manifesto, saying that
referendums are used with matters of shifting powers to Brussels. (Ed
Miliband…) Possibly the most undermining statement from the Prime Minister is
that he considers the referendum in 1975 to have solved the issue. Laurence
Mann, Cameron’s political private minister, controversially wrote, “We had a
referendum in 1975, which produced a very clear result.” This statement ignores
that every citizen under the age of 53, which includes Cameron himself, has not
been given the chance to voice their opinions on the matter.
This has left much of the country infuriated. Leading Eurosceptic Douglas
Carswell, also a member of the Conservative Party, counters Mann’s statement
with, “By that logic we wouldn’t bother to have general elections. If you follow
that argument, we should just scrap elections. What surprises me is that we just
had a referendum on electoral reform despite the fact that it was not in our
election manifesto. We had a referendum to satisfy the desires of one section of
the political class but the government isn’t prepared to have one in response to the
concern of millions of voters about our relationship with the EU.” This is a
powerful statement on its own, but considering that Carswell is a member of
Cameron’s own party it carries more weight.
Cameron is coming under fire from other members of his party as well;
some have made it very clear that they would resign their positions if it meant
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opposing the referendum. Stewart Jackson, parliamentary private secretary to
Northern Ireland Secretary Owen Paterson, told the BBC: “This is a question of
putting, I believe, country and constituency first and party second.” Conservative
backbencher Mark Pritchard issued a similar statement: “This is about country
first, party second and career last.” (Walker) Tim Montgomerie, the editor of
ConservativeHome, a website for grassroots conservatives, writes, “It is both
ridiculous and insulting for Cameron’s office to suggest the 1975 referendum
means we don’t need a vote now… Just as importantly, the EU was then
described as the Common Market or the EEC. Since then the Common Market
has moved very substantially towards a political union.” (Shipman) Montgomerie
is picking up on this change in the public’s opinion of the EU stemming from a
change from the identity of the EU itself.
These dissenting members of the government face a three line whip from
Cameron and the opposing members of the Conservative Party. In the United
Kingdom, a three-line whip is a strict instruction to both attend and vote in a
prescribed manner. Going against the whip in any case has the potential for
severe consequences including termination of employment.
It is partially because of this that the referendum received so much media
attention. The motion calling for the referendum was defeated in a vote in the
Commons of 483 to 111. Though this was a definitive margin, 81 of the Tory
MPs voted for the motion and another two adamantly abstain. Along with the 81
Tory MPs, 19 Labour and one Liberal Democrat MP also voted in support of the
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referendum. This is the largest rebellion of the Conservative Party in any
European Union member state. (Kirkup)
It will take years for the implications of this proposed referendum to take
effect on British membership in the European Union. The importance of this
debate is its potential fallout with voters in the future. (D’Arcy) It could be the
beginning of a stronger movement to leave the European Union or it could be a
fleeting initiative from only a few members of the Conservative Party. Countries
naturally fluctuate in support of supranational institutions like the European
Union. This stands in direct comparison to the initial referendum on membership
in 1975. The October 2011 referendum is an interesting data point on the overall
decline in support since the 1970s. In the 1975 referendum, 67.2% of those who
participated voted in favor of membership in Europe, compared to the 26%
currently thinking the EU is a good thing by the latest Eurobarometer reading.
The 1975 Referendum
This referendum is a starting point from which to examine the declining
support for the European Union in the United Kingdom given that the European
institutions are regarded very differently in 2011 than in 1975.
After accession to the EEC in 1973, an economic crisis drove Heath, the
Conservative Prime Minister, out of office and reinstated Wilson, the leader of the
Labour Party. Wilson was elected Prime Minister in 1974 partially on a platform
to situate the United Kingdom in terms of EEC membership and subsequently
hold a referendum, stating, “I welcome this Election - I welcome, more than
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anything else, this opportunity for the British people to give their verdict upon the
last three years and eight months of Conservative Government. Let the people
vote; let us work together again.” (Wilson, Harold) Wilson knew of the split in
not only his cabinet but of the sensitivity of the issue and put the matter to a
referendum. (Young 280) With the country still badly divided over Europe in
1975, the British government held a referendum, proposed by Labour Tony Benn,
asking this simple question: Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the
European Community (the common market)?
Along with the party on the whole, Wilson’s Labour cabinet was split in
support for membership in the EEC. The cabinet included both right-wing proEuropeans like Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, left-wing critics including
Michael Foot and Barbara Castle, and a new movement of radicals led by Tony
Benn. Given the mixed opinions, Wilson decided to suspend the Cabinet’s
collective responsibility, which requires all cabinet members to publicly support
all government decisions even if they privately disagree. This allowed the
members of the cabinet to campaign for which side they supported against each
other. The debate became divided into two camps: the “Yes” campaign, headed
by Prime Minister Wilson and 16 cabinet members, and the “No” campaign by
the other seven members of the cabinet.
The “Yes” campaign was officially endorsed by the government, given the
support of Wilson and the three most senior cabinet members. Joining was the
majority of the Conservative Party, including their recently elected party leader
Margaret Thatcher, stating at a news conference, “The majority of the
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Conservative Party both in Parliament and in the country – the vast majority – is
in favor of staying in Europe. The minority which is against it is getting smaller.”
(Conservatives Favor…) The “No” campaign included the seven opposing
cabinet members and other, smaller parties.
The vote on June 5, 1975 showed 67.2% of the total population was in
favor of continued membership with a 65% turn out. The break down as to the
individual countries is as follows (Cook):
Country

# Vote No

% No

Turnout

England

# Vote
% Yes
Yes
14,918,009 68.7%

6,812,052

31.3%

65.9%

Wales

869,135

64.8%

472,071

35.2%

66.8%

Scotland

1,332,186

58.4%

948,039

41.6%

58.6%

52.1%
Northern 259,251
Ireland
Total UK 17,378,581 67.2%

237,911

47.9%

47.4%

8,470,073

32.8%

64.7%

The decision in this referendum secured the United Kingdom’s place in Europe
politically and overall showed a majority in support for Europe. The 1975 and
2011 referendums are two valuable data points in beginning to examine what
happened in the United Kingdom for such a change in support to happen. Using
this information, I will look at the history of the United Kingdom in Europe to
answer why support has always been lower.
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Part II: History of the United Kingdom in Europe
Joining the EEC
Discerning why this change in support happened begins with looking into
the more recent history of the United Kingdom and her evolving relationship with
Europe. Such Euroskepticism exhibited by some of the elite as well as the
general public today is not new. These feelings have existed in the United
Kingdom for some time. In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was struggling
to recover from the devastation of the war. It was in this setting in 1949 that Jean
Monnet proposed an Anglo-French common market, which the United Kingdom
turned down. After the war, British politicians saw the state of the rest of Europe
and did not feel like a member of Europe. (Pugh 320) Instead, Monnet turned to
Germany with his idea, excluding the United Kingdom from the initial wave of
European Integration. The first initiative from this proposal was the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Churchill saw no great importance
in a closer relationship with France and Germany and rather wanted to focus on
relations with the US and maintaining the closeness of the Commonwealth.
(Young) This attitude carried over to a European defense community proposed in
1954.
The six founding states of European integration, France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, once again invited the United
Kingdom to join talks concerning further integration in 1955, which the Churchill
and Eden governments both declined. They believed that such cooperation could
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lead to political federalism in Europe, and consequently would threaten the
sovereignty of each member state. (Pugh 320) The six states signed the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and once
again the United Kingdom had missed an opportunity. (Pugh 320) In an attempt
to counter this economic union, the United Kingdom established the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) along with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria,
Switzerland and Portugal. EFTA, however, proved to not be an adequate counter
to the EEC both economically and politically. It could not compete with the
growing economy of Europe.
In the early 1960s, the United Kingdom began to regret not joining in
European integration when membership was offered. (Pugh 321) Former
American Secretary of State Dean Acheson noticed that “Great Britain had lost an
Empire and has not yet found a role.” The states of the EEC were reducing tariffs,
unifying external duties, making central institutions and stimulating greater
economic growth than the United Kingdom could achieve. In 1961, Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan made the nation’s first application for membership in
the EEC. Macmillan was more in favor of Europe than either Churchill or Eden,
yet he could not take too many risks with his own seriously divided Conservative
Party. The statement from Acheson outraged many Conservatives, yet the party
was divided over Europe. (Pugh 322) Macmillan started moving pro-Europeans
such as Edward Heath, Christopher Soames and Duncan Sandys into more
prominent positions in the government.
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Negotiations concerning the United Kingdom’s membership began in
September 1961, but were interrupted in 1963 by French President de Gaulle’s
veto. Macmillan had been trying to re-establish a defense relationship with the
US and de Gaulle did not want the US trying to usurp any influence in the EEC.
It was also clear to de Gaulle that the United Kingdom changed its position more
based on a fear of losing its traditional role rather than fervor for the European
Community. (Pugh 322)
This might have stopped the British effort to join the EEC if not for the
new government of Harold Wilson being elected in 1964. Wilson was very
dedicated to modernizing British society, and much of his efforts were directed in
the United States’ direction. When again this relationship did not benefit the
United Kingdom, along with the promotion of more pro-Europe ministers, more
politicians and citizens began to see the UK’s future in Europe. In this spirit
Wilson applied for membership in the EEC in 1966. De Gaulle vetoed the
application again in 1967 citing similar reasons from 1963.
In 1970, the United Kingdom elected a true Europe enthusiast as Prime
Minister for the first time with Conservative Edward Heath. Support for
membership in the EEC was never divided on party lines, and members of the
Conservative and Labour Parties were hostile towards the notion of Europe. Also,
the interests of France in the EEC had changed by this point; de Gaulle had
resigned and France was experiencing a growing fear of the economic dominance
of Germany. (Pugh 323) The United Kingdom’s participation in the EEC might
counter Germany, making the idea more appealing to France.
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Heath was realistic in his expectations for negotiating entry; he knew that
the EEC was no longer a lofty idea but a proven success. (Pugh 324) In October
1971, the House of Commons approved ascension in a 356 to 244 vote, and Heath
signed the treaty in 1972. The bill needed to be passed in the Parliament, and it
was not until 1973 that the United Kingdom formally joined.
Further Distance From the EEC
After Wilson, economic hardships largely characterized James
Callaghan’s time as Prime Minister. In 1979, Conservative Margaret Thatcher
became Prime Minister, and British policy shifted from economic stability to
foreign relations. Thatcher never had the enthusiasm Heath did for Europe, and
also accused Heath of damaging the party. Thatcher in general took a more
aggressive and abrasive approach to foreign policy than her predecessors, often
times even being rude to foreigners. (Pugh 345) Thatcher and her followers did
not believe the EEC was the capitalist organization some members of the Labour
Party made it out to be, but rather feared that the new social and political policies
introduced by reforms and treaties to the EEC threatened to bring socialism into
the United Kingdom. (Pugh 352) The EEC at this point was beginning to include
the social and political elements some nations feared. When the UK joined in
1973 the EEC was much more focused on the economy. Thatcher supported the
common market of the EEC, but these new changes and expansion of policy
extended the EEC past what Thatcher thought was necessary of European
integration.
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Like most of the other twentieth century Prime Ministers, Thatcher felt a
need to boost the United Kingdom’s international standing. (Pugh 351) However,
by 1990 the end of British sovereignty as traditionally perceived was in sight.
Though her government regularly tried to block European legislation, such as
initiatives to improve infrastructure and push rights to maternity leave up to
“European” standards in the member states, this ultimately proved ineffective and
exposed a rift between the actions of the government and the desires of the British
people. (Pugh 354) The history of the United Kingdom and her relationship with
the European Union helps to answer why the United Kingdom has always had
lower support for the EU than other member states. Their refusal to join the EEC
in the 1950s and then being turned down for membership twice laid a firm
groundwork for skepticism of integrated Europe. Being skeptical of Europe is not
anything new for the United Kingdom. Given this lower starting point, support
for the EU has declined in the whole of the member states on average as well.
The next section will discuss the decline in opinion for not only the United
Kingdom, but with Europe on the whole.
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Part III: Changing Membership Opinion
Changing Opinion
This section will be looking at the decline in support for the European
Union in the United Kingdom in comparison to the whole EU. This shows the
data background for the decline in support exhibited in the United Kingdom, as
well as how support has always been lower than that of the EU27.
Since joining the EEC in 1973, the opinions of and support for the
European supranational institutions have generally been in decline among those
surveyed in the Eurobarometer. The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys given
by the European Commission beginning in 1973 and held every so often from six
months to a year. They cover topics such as purpose of the EU, benefits from the
EU and trust in the EU, and whether the EU is a good or bad thing. The 1975
EEC membership referendum marked a starting point in which a solid majority of
the British population was in favor of remaining in the EU. What the
Eurobarometer has been measuring since the 1990s is a decline of nearly all
positivity towards the EU and a marked increase in negativity.
On a basic level, the Eurobarometer addresses public opinion as to
whether the EU is a good thing. (Figure 3.1) The average of good opinions
changed -9% from September 1973 to May 2011 and opinions that it is a bad
thing increased +7%. These numbers do indicate a decrease in positive opinion of
the EU; it must be noted that the number concerning the positive feelings toward
the European Union have been very dynamic since 1973, with a spike around
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1991. The spikes could have been caused by incidental or one-time issues in one
or more countries, such as economic declines, not continual trends in the EU27 on
the whole. Since the 1990s, the “good thing” numbers have more or less been in
decline while indecisive and negative feelings have grown slightly. This suggests
Is the EU a good or a bad
thing? (EU) Fig. 3.1

that the decline in support for the European Union is not only an issue concerning
the United Kingdom, but could be a European wide issue in the future if these
trends continue. After the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 creating the
European Union out of the EEC, feelings that the European Union is a good thing
across the EU27 dropped 19% from 1991 to 1996. This proposes that perhaps the
signing of this Treaty that in effect brought a Constitution to the European Union
over stepped the intentions of the member states, the Unites Kingdom included.
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The opinion in the United Kingdom alone is much more erratic (Fig. 3.2).

Is the EU a good or bad
thing? (UK) Fig. 3.2

Their starting positive opinion in 1973 was only at 31%, which presents a
quandary when placed in comparison to the referendum the British government
held concerning membership which received 67.2% of the voters in support of

Is the EU a
good
thing? UK
vs. EU Fig.
3.3

EEC membership. This could be due to a different group of people responding to
the Eurobarometer survey or just more people not participating. As discussed
above, membership in the European supranational institutions have always been a
topic of debate for the British people, with citizens and parties alike not agreeing.
Since 1973, the supporting opinion only changed -5% down to 26%, yet this
support has fluctuated greatly over the years. As in the EU27, support rose
through the 80s and 90s, then support dropped from 57% to 35% from 1991 to
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1996, a total -22% change. This closely reflects the same numbers for the EU27,
dropping similarly in the same years. Figure 3.3 compares the support for the
European Union in the United Kingdom versus the EU27, and the correlation is
evident. This again points to the change in the EU brought on by the Maastricht
Treaty to be a cause for declining support, with both turning points after an
increase in support through the 1980s being around the early 1990s.
On the aggregate, the opinion towards the EU on the whole from the EU
27 average has been stable and relatively positive. The average opinion of those
who trust the EU has stayed fairly consistent around 40%, distrusting between
40% and 50%, with the percentage distrusting growing larger than the trusting in
2010. 2010 marks the year where certain member states’ economies started to
decline and a
Trust in the
European Union
on the whole
(EU) Fig. 3.4

financial
crisis began
to emerge in
the
Eurozone.
Again as

with the ECB, this may not be a direct causation, but it could have influenced it.
Figure 3.4 shows that the support for the EU on the average, though it has
dropped off in the past few years by a few percentage points, is fairly stable.
The opinion in the United Kingdom, however, is stable yet not as positive
as the EU27. (Fig. 3.5) The EU27 percentage trusting the EU has never dropped
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below 40%, while in the United Kingdom, the Eurobarometer polling starts at
20% in 2003
and in eight
years never

Trust in the European
Union on the whole
(UK) Fig. 3.5

broke 36%.
In the past
three years,
the average had stabilized within 5 points fluctuating between 20%-25%. For the
United Kingdom, the majority of the population either does not trust the European
Union or does not know. Those without an opinion have been dropping since
2003, from 22.2% to 13%. The population has been making up their minds and a
good amount of those people have definitively decided that they do not trust the
EU. The tendency not to trust the European Union has increased from 57.5% to
63%, with a peak of 68% in June 2010.
Through this data, it becomes evident that support for the European Union
in the United Kingdom has been in decline since their initial ascension in 1973.
Support for Europe in the United Kingdom is varied across the nation, and a
general distrust for the European Union on the whole is evident from the
Eurobarometer in comparison to the rest of the EU. The institutions of the
European Union are designed to be equal to every nation involved and provide
each member state the opportunity to participate in the operation and decisions of
the institution.
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The 2010 Eurobarometer also measured in all the EU27 countries what the
EU means to them personally. Citizens of each European Union country were
asked what the significance of the EU is to them personally over a range of topics,
from social to economic factors. These factors cover many of the areas of
influence that the EU has been asserting over in the individual lives of its citizens.
Figure 3.6 shows the results from this survey with the country with the highest
and lowest percentage saying yes to each factor as well as the United Kingdom
percentage and the EU average percentage on the whole.
Fig. 3.6 What Does the EU Mean to You

For the factors that are positive things (travel/work, euro, peace, stronger
say in politics, diversity, democracy, economic prosperity and social protection),
the United Kingdom average fell well below the EU average, nowhere near the
highest, and in a few cases is the country with the lowest percentage. For
negative factors (waste of money, bureaucracy, unemployment, not enough border
control, increased crime and loss of cultural identity), with the exception of
unemployment and an increase in crime, the United Kingdom averages are higher
than the EU27 average. This indicates that the perceived outcomes of the EU are
wholly negative to the British public. They do not see many positive factors and
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feel as if the EU has ushered in many negative effects on a personal level. It is
this local level that hits most people the hardest. National policies tend to not
have a drastic effect on the lives of the average citizen, and when these citizens
perceive such negativity it exposes a deep level of concern for their status in the
EU.
A declining trust in the institutions of the EU by the United Kingdom
should also be noted. The following graphs show this change in support for the
European Parliament compared to the averages of the EU27. The European
Parliament, the representative body of the European Union, has its membership
based on percentage of the population of the member states. With the passage of
the Treaty of Lisbon, the number of MEPs (members of the European Parliament)
was reduced to 736, with the President serving as a non voting member. The
United Kingdom has 72 votes, tied for second most with France, which represents
about 13.5% of the voting power. The Parliament has three main roles:
negotiating and passing laws, exercising democratic supervision over the other
EU institutions, and sets the EU budget (Europa – EP).
Over the past 5 years, from Figure 3.7, the EU27 average of trust in the
European
Parliament

Trust in the European
Parliament (EU) Fig. 3.7

has been
steadily
decreasing.
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The Eurobarometer results for the EU27 begins with 54% of European citizens
tending
Trust in the European
Parliament (UK) Fig. 3.8

to trust
the
European
Parliame
nt in

1993. By the last reading in 2011, this number had dropped to 45%. In contrast,
the same poll in the United Kingdom (figure 3.8) showed a similar, yet more
drastic trend. Both the tendency to trust and the tendency not to trust the
European Parliament have been decreasing and increasing, respectively, like in
the EU on the whole. However, while the EU27 average changed -11%, the
British average dropped from 48% in 1993 to 23% in 2011, a -25% change. The
beginning British average of 48% is also only 3 percentage points higher than the
EU27 average in 2011, showing a deeper distrust from the start.
Of all the other EU institutions, distrust of the European Parliament could
be the most concerning. The Parliament, through recent treaties, has arguabley
become the most powerful and influential institution of the EU due to its
representative nature. Every country receives the proportion of the vote it should
have through its population. If an institution is supposed to reflect the best
interests of the member states, the best chance it has is in a representative body.
Through recent British history, the British Parliament has been the focus of their
government, placing the highest national authority in this body. This shows a
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deep rooted distrust of the European Union if the United Kingdom cannot even
trust its supposed most representative body. Also in comparing the distrust for the

Tendency
to Distrust
the
European
Parliament
EU vs. UK
(Fig. 9)

EP between the European Union and the United Kingdom, the purpose of the
Lisbon Treaty to expand the democratic standards of the EU might not have been
as succssful as originally intended. The United Kingdom hovers around +10% in
distrust more than the EU (Fig. 9). Since 2007 when the Treaty of Lisbon was
signed, despite the attempt and to bring the EU closer to its citizens by increasing
the main representative body of the EU, distrust continued to rise in both entities1.
The
Eurobarometer also

Trust in the European
Commission (EU) Fig.
3.10

measured the
tendency to trust the
European
Commission. The
Commission is made up of 27 Commissioners, one from every member state, and
1

Strangely enough, there is no barometer poll for the European Council. The Council includes all
of the heads of state or government for the member states.
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each serves a 5-year term. The European Parliament must approve all
appointments to the Commission as well as the President. The Commission is
charged with representing and upholding the interests of the EU overall. It
performs its duties by proposing new laws to the Parliament and Council, helps to
manage the EU budget and allocation of funds, enforces EU law, and represents
the EU internationally, negotiating treaties and agreements among other
responsibilities (Europa EC). In the European Union average, an initial decline in
trust and an increase in a tendency not to trust happened from 1993 to around
1999. Since then, the variables tested have been fluctuating within about 10
percentage points with a general inclination toward declining trust and inclining
distrust. (Fig. 10)
Trust in
the European

Trust in the European
Commission (UK) Fig.
3.11

Commission
from the United
Kingdom has
dropped -13%,
from 53% in 1993 to 40% in 2011 (figure 3.11). The tendency to distrust, as well,
has been steadily increasing in the EU27. Not surprisingly, the averages in the
United Kingdom are similarly oriented, but with larger gradients than the EU27.
The British trust in the European Commission has decreased from 49% in 1993 to
only 20% in May of 2011. The percentages of those distrusting and not being
sure as to their opinion have increased accordingly.
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With the data from the Eurobarometer, beginning in 1973 and ending in
2011, it is clear that support for the European Union in the United Kingdom and
the EU27 alike has been in decline. While many different variables happen at the
same time, in the next section I will examine theories of support for European
integration on the individual level and expand them to the national level. With
these theories, I will attempt to explain why the United Kingdom as opposed to
other nations in the EU have always had low support. The data above shows how
the United Kingdom has usually been lower in support for the European Union
institutions than the EU average. This is different than decline in support over
time, which will be addressed later. The following section will look at different
theories on support for integration that attempt to explain why the United
Kingdom’s support has been lower than the average of the EU member states.
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Part IV: Theories on Integration
Much research, empirical testing and analysis has been done in regard to
individuals’ support for the European Union. Many hypotheses as to the varying
levels of support for the European Union have been tested covering social,
political and economic areas. Political scientists have tested a variety of theories
including cognitive ability, economic welfare, the Silent Revolution theory and
class partisanship. These theories were proposed and tested on an individual
basis, attempting to discern which citizens of a country would support European
Integration over others. I will be expanding these to a national level, treating the
individual countries as the individual citizens. With these expanded theories I
attempt to answer why the United Kingdom has always been lower in support for
the European Union than other member states.
One theory tested on varying degrees of support for the EU is the levels of
the citizen’s cognitive skills. Ronald Inglehart, who initially researched this
theory, argues that a high level of cognitive ability, defined as a high level of
political awareness and developed skills in political communication, gives the
citizens of a member state the means to more closely identify with a supranational
institution. From this, Inglehart argues that the higher an individual’s cognitive
ability, the more likely the individual is to support European integration. From
that, I argue that applying this theory to the country level becomes problematic
when trying to explain why the United Kingdom supports the EU less than other
nations. The theory relies on two assumptions: that information on the European
Union has a high level of abstraction and that information on integration promotes
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support (Inglehart, Ronald)
Ronald).. Research on this theory by Inglehart and others
using Eurobarometer surveys shows that as the cognitive ability of
o the citizen
increases, the more likely he is to understand and feel more comfortable with the
EU. From a first look, it follows that the United Kingdom’s support for the EU is
lower given that their education statistics are lower than most of the EU.
Education plays directly into this idea of cognitive ability. Education can
promote an understanding of the benefits of the European Union as well as how to
capitalize on it for personal gain. As far as education goes in the European
Union, the United Kingdom tends to be in the bottom for educational standards.
Figure 12 shows the percentage of 18 year olds in each member state still in the
education system. The EU25 average is 77%, with the highest state being
Sweden with 95.4% and the lowest Cyprus at 36.2% of 18 year olds still in
school. The United Kingdom is the third lowest in the EU25 with only 51.1% of
their 18 year olds in school. Along with this, the average age in school
expectancy for

Fig. 1 18-year olds in education, 2008

2

Refer to the Internet metadata file
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/educ_esms.htm
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/educ_esms.htm).
). Source: Eurostat
(tps00060)
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Fig. 2 School Expectancy, 2008

the United Kingdom is also lower than that of th
thee European Union. Figure 2
showss these statistics3. The EU average is 17.3 years, the highest is Finland (20.8
years) and the lowest Malta (13.5 years). The Uni
United
ted Kingdom sits not too far
behind the EU25 average at 16.5 years. Given the theory proposed and tested by
Inglehart and these statist
statistics, the United Kingdom’s reluctant approach to Europe
is logical.. If education in the United Kingdom is lower than other
er nations of the
European Union, their distrust and distaste due to lack of knowledge is feasible.
Where this theory snags, however, is in looking back into educational
numbers from
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School expectancy corresponds to the expected years of education over a lifetime and has been
calculated adding the single
single-year
year enrolment rates for all ages. Source: Eurostat (tps00052)
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assumption, when applied to the United Kingdom, that the numbers of students in
school and educational standards have not improved in the past forty years and
that as the European Union expanded, education did not expand with it.
However, education needs to be looked at over time. Since 1938, the number of
college students has been rapidly growing from less than 100,000 to over 500,000
and this number has only been growing from there. (Pugh 307) The United
Kingdom has always been divided on the issue of EUrope. This has not changed.
Educated college students are presumably the people that would be looking to
benefit from the market of the European Union given their education. The
number of these citizens with this level of education has been increasing, so it
would follow, according to Inglehart, that support for the EU would be increasing
as well. However, in this same time period, support for the European Union and
its institutions is decreasing. This does not follow with the proposed theory on
education.
Education on the whole, just not numbers of college students, has also
been improving. The chart below shows the number of students that have been
staying in
school from

80
60
Staying on at 16
40

1950 to 2000 at

Exam
Achievement

20
2000

1990
1995

1980
1985

1965
1970
1975

1955
1960

as well as the

0
1950

the age of 16

improvement of test scores over the same time period. (Machin, Vignoles) Like
the number of students in college, these number have all been increasing since
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even before the United Kingdom joined the EEC. This goes directly against
Inglehart’s theory. This may work on a citizen by citizen basis, but these numbers
disprove the theory when applied to the United Kingdom. Removing these
statistics from this context, it would follow with the increasing education, an
increase in support for the EU would follow and that is not happening.
I believe this is a good assessment of the theory as it applies to the United
Kingdom. Inglehart proposes that the lower an individual’s cognitive ability the
less opportunity the individual would have to understand the benefits of the
European Union and consequently feel more positively towards it. In expanding
this to a country level with the UK, as well as adding the variable of support over
time, does not adequately explain what is happening in the United Kingdom.
This is an area where there are many statistics and changes are easily followed.
Other theories discussed later do not have this statistical evidence available.
Along cognitive ability, the state of economic welfare in each of the
member states of the European Union can affect their position on integration.
Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer argue that citizens in differing socioeconomic
situations all over the EU experience different benefits and hardships associated
with their positions. (Gabel 336) They also discuss that their support for
integrationist policy is positively correlated with the welfare gains from this
integration. The integration of the EU has brought a liberalization of the EU labor
market and this differentially affects nations differently depending on their level
of education and occupational skills – sometimes referred to as human capital.
This is different from the educational argument mentioned above in that it
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pertains to functions and abilities in the job market rather than sheer mental
capabilities.
Given that human capital can be a strong predictor of a country’s ability to
adapt to the competition of a liberalized labor market, Gabel and Palmer (1995)
propose that a country’s human capital and support for the European Union
should have a positive correlation. I took this theory and applied it across the
European Union member states looking at their GDP per capita, and almost
treated the individual states like the individual citizens in Gabel and Palmer’s
argument. The more wealth a nation as well as the nation’s citizens individually
have, the more opportunity they have to exploit greater prospects in the more
liberalized market (Frieden).
The wealth of the United Kingdom expressly in comparison to the
European Union does somewhat follow with the United Kingdom’s support for
the EU sliding in the past few decades.
Country

Rank

Country

GDP Per Capita

Rank

Luxembourg

GDP Per
Capita
113,533

1

Ireland

47,513

16

Switzerland

81,161

4

Belgium

46,878

17

Denmark

59,928

7

France

44,008

19

Sweden

56,956

8

Germany 43,742

20

Netherlands

50,355

10

UK

38,592

22

Austria

49,809

11

Italy

36,267

25

Finland

49,350

12

Spain

32,360

26
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In terms of GDP per capita, the United Kingdom falls towards the end of the EU
member nation, being number 22 out of 27. GDP per capita does not take into

account cost of living for each country or exchange rate fluctuations so the
numbers can vary greatly from year to year. The Gini index is a measure is
statistical dispersion and can be applied to the wealth of nations. The higher the
percentage, the more unevenly the wealth in a nation is distributed among its
citizens. Since the late-1970s, the Gini index in the United Kingdom has been
gradually increasing from 26.8% to 34.5% in the most recent reading in the late
2000s. (The World Bank) The figure below shows the changes in the Gini Index
from 1979 to 2008. This indicates that the distribution of wealth in the UK has
been becoming more polarized with the wealth being more concentrated in a
smaller number of people. This means that there is a larger number of lower
economic bracket citizens now than there were 40 years ago.
While the United Kingdom is a wealthy nation, also being the 6th most
wealthy nation by GDP worldwide, the GDP per capita as well as their Gini index
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suggest there could be a gap in wealth.

Gabel and Palmer suggest that the

greater the income of an individual, the more likely they are to be able to take
advantage of the liberalized market of the EU. What can also be argued,
however, is how that income is distributed among the population can account for
varying levels of support throughout the citizens of the nation. The country on
the whole could be very wealthy, but the wealth disparity could be very great
creating different levels of support for integration among varying levels of wealth.
Comparatively, the Gini index for the United Kingdom is normal and
within the range for these numbers in the European Union. While the number in
the United Kingdom are slightly higher, they are right in the range of many of the
European nations. While it is true that the Gini index has risen since the 1970s,
Country

GDP Ranking

Gini Index
(CIA) 1
30 (1994)
32.7 (1995)
36.8 (1999)

Gini Index
(CIA) 2
27 (2006)
32.7 (2008)
34 (2005)

4
Germany
5
France
6
United
Kingdom
8
27.3 (1995) 32 (2006)
Italy
12
32.5 (1990) 32 (2005)
Spain
16
32.6 (1994) 30.9 (2007)
Netherlands
20
31.6 (1998) 34.2 (2008)
Poland
for the last fifteen years the index number has not changed all that much. The
other nations around this GDP are not experiencing the same negativity towards
the European Union as the United Kingdom, so this could not be a factor
differentiating the United Kingdom from the rest of Europe, given that it is also
the third wealthiest nation in the European Union.
Similar to the data available on education, wealth and wealth distribution
is easily expressed numerically. GDP per capita is a clear measure of individuals’
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average wealth in the United Kingdom, as well as makes comparisons in wealth
easy across many nations. As this applies to support for European integration,
however, is less definitive. The correlation between this wealth and support,
however, is difficult to prove given the ambiguous mature of social sciences and
with the data readily available. Through interviews and surveys this could be
better explored, but I cannot do it with the data I use. With more attention to the
inclinations of individuals towards the European Union compared to their income,
this could be more conclusive.
Another theory postulated is Inglehart’s Silent Revolution. (Gabel 1998)
Inglehart proposes that support for European Integration is related to the
economic and political values of each member state. These values then play into
each nation’s sense of identity, which is not easily changed and can have a large
impact on feelings toward integration. Values are broken up into two groups:
materialists and post-materialists. Materialists are concerned with economic and
physical values, while post-materialists care more about intellectual fulfillment
and self-actualization. Earlier testing and research on this topic by Inglehart
predicted that the materialist nations would be more attracted to the European
Union given the tendency of the EU to push for more egalitarian over nationalistic
reform. Gabel, however, reassessed this hypothesis by looking at the
Eurobarometer results from 1975 to 1992 in which EU citizens were asked what
their nation’s first priority goals should be. They were given the following
options: “(a) maintaining order in the nation; (b) giving the people more say in
important government decisions; (c) fighting rising prices; and (d) protecting
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freedom of speech.” To be considered materialist, those responding answered (a)
or (c); to be post-materialist, they would answer (b) or (d). What Gabel found
through his research is it is the materialists that are more supportive than the postmaterialists.
This relates to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Huitt). Materialistic
countries are farther down on the pyramid, needing to develop their sense of
political and economic
safety, as illustrated in
choices (a) and (c). These
tend to be the newer
countries so ascend to the
EU. They have not had the
time to stabilize within the European Union system both economically and
politically given the standards for entry. The countries that are more stable both
economically and politically, which tend to be among the first to enter the EU,
have the capability to be more concerned with issues that are higher up on the
pyramid given than they are more established in the fundamental needs. These are
the post-materialist nations that can be concerned with issues higher up on the
pyramid like choices (b) and (d).
The European Union tends to present more of an egalitarian society with
less of a focus on the individual nation. The materialist nations favor the
European Union more that the post-materialists because the EU can be the force
for reform in their nations that the post-materialists do not need. (Inglehart,
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Rabier, Reif) I believe the United Kingdom falls more into the post-materialist
category. They do not have the economic and political adaptation struggles that
many of the new member states to the European Union may have. Matthew
Gabel writes that these conditions and values set in a population, including
national identity, tend to persist over a citizen’s lifetime. (Gabel 1998)
Gabel associates education and income with a country’s utilitarian support
for the European Union. In the previous two theories, the United Kingdom is
behind the rest of the EU in education standards and while in the middle as it
pertains to GDP per capita, it has a more unequal distribution of wealth than the
rest of the EU. So while some of the country could be more post-materialistic in
tendencies and political values, the deficiencies in education and wealth
distribution could foster some of these materialist values more commonly held by
the newer nations. With these factors being present, it could contribute to the
decline in support for the EU.
Of all the theories examined, the Silent Revolution is the most uncertain.
There is little to no statistical evidence that could classify a country either way or
track changes in the nations over time. Karl Popper, a 20th century philosopher
discounted many social theories as being unscientific due to their inability to be
falsified. (Popper…) These kinds of social theories cannot be definitively proved
true or false. This applies to the Silent Revolution. Nothing exists to decisively
prove it true or false, so by an analytical standpoint, this could be true but no
evidence proves it or disproves it. However, through data collecting methods
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such as interviewing or surveys, the Silent Revolution and like theories could be
more definitively expressed.
Aside from characteristics of the citizens and nations on the whole,
individual partisanship can have an effect on support for integration independent
of personal characteristics. (Gabel 1998) Speaking generally, citizens tend to
follow the attitudes toward integration that their party has. Specifically, Inglehart,
Rabier and Reif found partisan cuts in support for European integration. Using
the Eurobarometer, they found that followers of leftist parties tend to be more
skeptical of integration while followers of parties on the right were more inclined
to favor integration.
Applying this to the situation in the United Kingdom presents an
interesting quandary. First looking at the Conservative Party, Prime Minister and
conservative David Cameron supports European integration and for a long time
did everything he could to block the possibility of a referendum concerning the
United Kingdom’s place in the European Union. What is interesting about this,
then, is that the call for the referendum came from a conservative MP. When the
vote for the referendum was held, 81 conservative MPs broke the three line whip
given by Cameron along with 19 Labour MPs and one Liberal Democrat. Not
only does this mark the greatest conservative rebellion over Europe, but it is a
break from this theory pertaining to party affiliation. The Conservative Party in
the United Kingdom is clearly split over this issue, and if leaders of the party
cannot follow the determined party stance the rest of the party members do not
have the united party front on the issue.
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Partisanship could also be looked at in the sense that Euroskeptical parties
could impart Euroskeptical views on the nation’s citizens. Individuals can take
political cues from their parties. If leaders of both parties are skeptical of Europe,
it would follow that members of the parties would reflect these views. While the
Labour party has been more supportive of Europe since the 1970s, support for
Europe is not a concrete positive or negative for either major party. This is likely
a major contributor to the feelings of Euroskepticism in the country as well as
these feelings not existing only within party lines.
The debate over membership in the European institutions was never a
party issue in the sense that one party was for integration and one was against.
The entire nation and its parties have been split since the original institutions
formed. This theory does not help explain the case of the United Kingdom. The
Conservative Party has always been split on the issue, from Wilson when the
United Kingdom joined to now with Cameron, even the party in control has never
been unified on this. Therefore, members of the Conservative Party currently do
not get solid united opinion they could follow.
The Silent Revolution has the least certainty judging by the statistics
available, political partisanship is the second. Members of parties can be counted
and party platforms evaluated but with the example of the United Kingdom, the
values of political parties are not the only view held by members in the party. On
the whole, Britons that lean towards the Conservative Party tend to support the
EU less, and members of the Labour Party tend to support it more but this is not
definitive. It would be difficult to discern if the party has any definitive effect on
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the members of the party. Testing for party cues on an individual level is more
feasible, however I cannot test for this using the data that I do.
Aside from theories and characteristics of the United Kingdom, the
nation’s history also sets it apart from the rest of the European Union in regard to
integration. This history has firmly situated an inherent euroskepicism in the
values of the British people. First off, the United Kingdom is an island nation,
giving the nation a certain “island mentality”. Their geography has always set the
country apart from the rest of the mainland European Union as well as serving as
protection for centuries against invasion that so many other nations were
susceptible to. This also gave the United Kingdom the feeling of being an
outsider country, never fully as included in the European Union as others.
The United Kingdom also has a long and rich imperial history lasting as
recently as 1922. The empire included colonies on every continent at one point,
including the Thirteen Colonies, British Guiana, British Antarctica Territory,
Egypt, Ireland, India and Australia. Joining the EEC and later on the European
Union logically implies a loss of certain exclusive powers by the member states.
Independence and strength in politics are part of the British tradition, giving
reason to the nation’s reluctance to completely join the European communities
and implicates euroscepticism as a cultural value. (Spiering)
Where this falls short is in considering the empires of other nations
disassembled in the same era. During the 1950s and 1960s Macmillan
successfully dismantled much of the British empire without much of the ill
feelings experienced by other imperial nations. The bitterness France felt in
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losing Algeria or Portugal with Mozambique and Angola did not have an
equivalent in the United Kingdom. (Pugh 351) While some members of the
Conservative Party resented the decline of the United Kingdom as a great imperial
power, this does not provide an explanation for why the UK would be feeling
differently towards European integration due to imperial history. What the United
Kingdom does still have is the British Commonwealth, which still includes 54
nations. This could be a reminder of the “glory days” of the British Empire, or
still color their opinion of integration as not needing to be a part of the integrated
EU and that they have the ability to be independent.
Rather, the United Kingdom’s experience in the 1940s during World War
II might provide a better historical distinction from the rest of the European
Union. World War II was the most devastating loss of life the world has ever
seen, not only in battle but also with the millions of lives lost in the Holocaust.
This permanently changed the landscape and climate of Europe. The United
Kingdom had a very different experience than any other member state of the
European Union today did. The war had been a unifying experience for the
country; where the war defeated some nations such as France, the United
Kingdom was the major European ally power throughout the war. The United
States and the Soviet Union may have had the greater armies and suffered the
greatest loss of life, but the United Kingdom was unique in Europe.
The United Kingdom also emerged in a better financial situation than the
rest of Europe. Their industrial capacity was higher in 1945 than before the war
in 1939. In 1947 their exports were five times those of France and larger than
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those of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway
and Denmark combined. Germany’s income was a third of what it was in 1938,
France less than a half and the Franc virtually worthless, and Italian exports were
at the level they were at in 1911. The United Kingdom truly emerged as the
European giant after the war in an economic sense. With many of the nations in
bankruptcy, the UK became the continent’s creditor.
Not only did the United Kingdom have more financial stability after the
war, but they learned a different lesson than the rest of Europe. France fell to the
Axis as did most of the rest of Europe. The United Kingdom was the major
European power fighting against the Axis powers. From this, France learned that
cooperation between European nations was necessary to promote peace and
prevent war. Germany probably was trying to get back into Europe any way they
could after the war. The United Kingdom learned something different. They
learned that they did not need to rely on Europe. Half the continent had declared
war against the Allies, France fell and the United Kingdom held on. Through
this, they also established a strong relationship with the United States.
Taking this into consideration, it stands to reason that twenty years later
when the EEC was being formed, the UK would lament the loss of this superiority
it experienced. Hugo Young wrote of the UK in 1945, from “that exquisite sense
of national selfhood, and the of vindication going with it – stemmed all the large
decision of the British foreign policy for the next fifteen years.” It is this
experience, not the loss of the empire thanks to Macmillan, that sets the United
Kingdom apart from the rest of the European Union from a historical standpoint.
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Some of the British population had a hard time losing their strength and high
position in Europe. Twenty years after they were the superpower of Europe, they
were being asked to join an institution with the countries whose combined exports
the UK had once surpassed. To fall from having such power to losing to Europe
could be the root of euroscepticism in the United Kingdom and could be why the
United Kingdom and not other European nations tends to exhibit negative feelings
toward the EU. (Pugh 351)
The theories of varying support for integration suggest an interesting
marker in this shift of support in the United Kingdom, as well as display the
interconnected and confusing nature of the theories. Socioeconomic factors such
as education and income can affect which political party a citizen will follow
given their own levels and the platforms and manifestos of the parties. In the case
of the United Kingdom, the Labour Party led the United Kingdom to EU
membership in 1975. The Labour Party developed in the early 19th century from
trade union movements and socialist groups seeking to gain more representation
on the national scene. Since then, the party has mainly drawn support from
middle class working citizens that would not have the educational and economic
opportunities of the upper classes. This may have led the middle class to have
more materialistic values when it came to integration. With the Labour Party in
control, this partially may attribute to the support for entering the EU in 1975.
Since then, however, the Conservative Party has gained more support and
currently is the dominant party in British politics. The Conservative Party, like
other conservative parties worldwide, supports the free market and the more
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traditional views of certain citizens. In recent years, many British citizens have
come out saying that the Tory Party is the party for the rich and well off,
concerned primarily with their interests. (Grice) If this is the party for the
wealthy, and the wealthy can usually afford higher education, so it might also be
the party for the educated. With Gabel linking education and income with postmaterialist values, this could explain why the request for a referendum on
membership in the European Union came from the Conservative Party. Postmaterialists, according to Gabel, do not have the levels of support for European
integration as the materialists do. The shift of control of government from the
Labour Party in 1975 to the Conservatives now in power links all of these factors
together to make a complex argument for why support in the United Kingdom has
shifted. It is nearly impossible to isolate one of these factors with how
interconnected they truly are.
This is also not to say, however, that the United Kingdom is the only
nation exhibiting these tendencies. Larger, more productive nations, such as
Germany and France, also have similarities to the United Kingdom concerning
these theories of support. Where the difference comes in, however, is that the
United Kingdom displays the opportunity for all of them at once while Germany
and France only have a few. For example, Germany is a wealthy nation, like the
UK, but has a lower Gini index percentage of 28.31%, suggesting more equal
wealth distribution. Germany also falls 8th worldwide for average years of
schooling with 10.2 years, in comparison to the UK’s 14th place and 9.4 years.

Page | 47

Looking at these hypotheses for why the United Kingdom rather than
other EU nations is experiencing this decline in support for the European Union,
not a one stands out as a definitive explanation. They all may apply, but there are
other member states with similar conditions and none have the negativity toward
the EU as the United Kingdom. The difficulty of the theories not being easily
isolated adds to the discrediting of the theories on the individual. One may play
into another, one may influence another and as with social and political sciences
they are never definitive. It is clear that these theories cannot be properly
expanded to explain support on a country by country basis, given the varying
populations in each country, as well as the added variable of time in this case.
Between adding time as a variable and the variance in population, the isolation of
any theory beside that of history does not give a proper explanation.
The explanation that sets the UK the most apart from the rest of the EU is
their experience in the 1940s. No other country had the experience of the United
Kingdom both during and after World War II. They were the only major
European country in the Ally effort, became the European creditor and power
afterwards, and saw it all slip away less than thirty years after. It follows then that
such a nation would not be eager to join the European supranational institutions
and thus lose this power they so enjoyed in the post-war Europe. I believe this is
the best answer for why the United Kingdom, and not other nations, are
experiencing this drop in concern.
The previous section answers why the United Kingdom has always been
lower in support than the rest of the EU. As a nation, they have a unique history
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that colored their joining the EEC in 1973. This set them off in a manner less
supportive than other countries. Yet since they joined, support has not only been
lower but also been in decline like the rest of Europe. The second part of the
question of the United Kingdom in Europe is why support has been in decline. In
looking at the case of the United Kingdom in Europe, the first question to be
answered is why support has always been lower, and second why has support
been declining.
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Part V: Evolution of the European Institution and Overall Decline
in Support
Declining Support for the European Union
The EU was born out of a loose economic union of only six nations. The
institutional component of the European Union began in 1951 with the
establishment of the ECSC. The main goal of the ECSC was to integrate the
production of materials used in warfare to prevent future conflict. From these
more simple beginnings, with each additional enlargement round and the many
treaties, the integrated Europe grew larger. The EEC began with establishing a
common market, and since has expanded its reach into more and more areas of
economics as well as social issues. The United Kingdom joined EFTA first to be
a part of the trade union and stay away from the integration of the six founding
members of the EEC, as discussed before.
The next treaty after the treaties of Rome that established the EEC and
Euratom was the Merger Treaty signed in 1967 that brought the three separate
communities together under a single institutional structure. A single Council and
a single Commission replaced the three Councils of ministers of the three
institutions and the Commissions of the EEC and Euratom and the High Authority
of the ECSC respectively. The treaty also introduced a single budget. (Treaty
Establishing…) This treaty can be considered the beginnings of the integrated
institutions of the EU.
Further internal integration happened in 1986 with the Single European
Act (SEA). Other than some institutional changes regarding the workings of the
EEC, the SEA had the objective of creating an internal market over the time
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period until December 31, 1992. The single market is defined as “an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” While certain
social policies already existed in the EEC, but this act extends the reach of the
EEC into labor conditions, management of labor relations, environmental
protection and an article providing that the member states had to jointly create and
execute a European foreign policy. (The Single European…) 10 years after
joining the EEC and its minimal social intervention and simpler common market,
the EEC had taken many steps toward pushing the European integration past
economic and into the social realm.
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 shaped the European Union more into how
it functions today. The treaty created the three pillars of the European Union that
covered political as well as economic areas. The pillars include the European
Community pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, and the
Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The European Community pillar established the
EU’s supra-national institutions, the Commission, European Parliament and Court
of Justice, and had the most power and influence of the pillars. The other two
pillars have more of a committee structure composed of delegates from each of
the member states.
Since the Maastricht Treaty, two smaller treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty
(1997) and the Nice Treaty (2001) made refinements to the existing institution. A
Constitutional Treaty was signed in 2004, but failed to be ratified in all the
member states, the United Kingdom being one of them. The European Union had
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grown to 27 members from the original six, and institutional reform and
consolidation seemed necessary. The goal of the Constitution for Europe was to
replace the founding treaties of the EU. Creating a concrete Constitution for
Europe, though, was a step that man nations simply were not ready to take. After
the Constitutional Treaty failed, a conference in Lisbon met to find an alternative
to this. The Lisbon Treaty aimed to strengthen democracy in the EU by shifting
more power to the European Parliament. In addition to increasing the power of
the most representative and democratic institution of the EU, the treaty also
simplified the legislative process and made the functioning of the EU more
flexible.
It would follow that the United Kingdom would not support changes like
this to the EU. They often felt throughout their relationship in Europe that they
did not have a strong voice in the functioning of the EU, such as Thatcher not
being able to successfully block European legislation in the early 1990s.
However, an increase in the democratic elements of the EU did not satisfy the
United Kingdom and support continued to drop.

Future of the United Kingdom in Europe
From 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the then EEC, the European
supranational institution has grown a considerable about larger and now
encompasses more than it ever did before. The institution the UK joined in 1973
is very difference from the institution it is a member of in 2012. The EEC of the
1973 was a supranational institution that the value and characteristics of the
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United Kingdom could generate more support from than the institution of today.
While I do argue that the euroskepticism in the United Kingdom is a historical
issue, the referendum proposed in 2011 happened because of their decline after
the 1940s. With the history of imperialism as well as the lesson learned after
World War II, the United Kingdom would not be willing or enthusiastic to have
the EU grow to also include political and social issues.
An added factor that makes why support for the European Union has been
in decline is the recent economic troubles of Europe. Europe is currently in what
an article in The Economist calls a “half-depression.” (Europe’s Half…)
Unemployment rates have been steadily on the rise since 2008, rising from 10.0%
a year ago to 10.8% in February. Greek unemployment reached 21.0% in
December, Spanish
unemployment rose a
full three points in the
past year to hit 23.6% in
February, Italian rose a
full point in the past
year, and Portuguese
from 12.3% as of February 2011 to 15.0% in February of 2012. Employment
conditions also do not seem to be improving. The March Purchasing Managers’
Index shows production activity in the euro zone down hitting a three-month low.
Spanish and French productivity appears to be slowing, and what is more
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concerning is the slowing in the manufacturing of both the Netherlands and
Germany.
It is hard to tell if the decreases in support are coming from the European
Union becoming too encompassing or if they are a reaction to the economy
slumping. As the economy continues to slow, richer countries like the United
Kingdom, Germany and France, will need to pay into the European Union so the
EU can pay out to the countries that may need it, like Portugal, Spain and Greece.
Considering the decline in support and the initiative for the referendum in
2011 another move for to leave the European Union is not totally out of reach.
Also given the patterns in the Eurobarometer results, support and positivity
towards the EU will probably continue to drop. I do not believe that the United
Kingdom leaving the European Union is feasible in the near future. For the most
part, any European Union country could not manage economically on their own
outside the EU. The individual economies do not have the ability to compete with
the integrated EU market.
The decline in support not only in the United Kingdom but also in the
European Union on the whole for the European Union could be due to the
economic trouble in the EU, the European Union entering too many aspects of
European life or for a multitude of other reasons. The European Union has grown
well past its original intentions and past the pretenses under which the UK joined.
For why the support for the European Union has always been lower in the United
Kingdom than other nations, their history sets them apart more than any of the
theories discussed. They learned from the war that they do not need to rely on
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Europe, and was therefore reluctant to join an institution that would take away
from their sovereignty and place them in a position of close cooperation with
Europe. While settled peacefully, the British Empire being dismantled must have
still effected some members of the nation, and the country still has the
Commonwealth. What sets the United Kingdom apart from the rest of the EU in
regard to opinion is their willingness to put the matter to a referendum. The
position of the United Kingdom in Europe is shaky. While I do not believe there
is a current threat of them leaving, given their feelings of skepticism towards the
EU as well as their standing opt outs, I do not believe they will be getting any
closer to Europe. Moving forward, the issue of Europe may become more
pressing for British leaders and they will need to tread carefully.
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Summary of Capstone Project
In my Capstone, I examined two questions: why has support for the
European Union always been lower in the United Kingdom and why is support
for the European Union in decline?
I start by looking at a referendum proposed in 2011 to have a vote on the
course of action the United Kingdom should take in regard to their relationship
with Europe. While the vote was defeated and the vote never happened, this
shows the existence of Euroskepticism (a skeptical attitude towards integrated
Europe) in the UK and that it is gaining momentum. I then look at the first
referendum on European membership the UK had in 1975, in which 67.2% of the
population voted in favor or being in the EEC. The two provide a contrast in the
opinion of the leaders and citizens in regards to membership in the EU.
I then go back and look at the history of the United Kingdom and its
relationship in Europe. The history proves that Euroskepticism has roots in the
reluctant manner in which the UK joined Europe. As a nation, Euroskepticism
has always been present in some form or another. After that, I use the
Eurobarometer to look at the statistics for the decline in support of membership in
Europe. The Eurobarometer is a collection of surveys that ask the citizens of the
EU their opinions on the EU, its policies, its purpose, etc.
To answer the first question, I looked at four theories of support for
European integration as it applies to individuals. I then expanded these theories to
the national level, treating the United Kingdom on the whole as an individual. I
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examined the theories of cognitive ability, wealth per capita, the Silent Revolution
and partisanship. Finally, I examine the history of the United Kingdom as it
applies to setting the country apart from others in the European Union. For the
second question, I look at the changing policies and practices of the European
Union as well as the current economic crisis that could be contributing to this
decline.
I found that these theories do not explicitly explain why the United
Kingdom has always been lower in support. For education, the theory states that
the higher educated an individual, the more they would be able to understand and
capitalize on the EU, therefore support it more. As this applies to the United
Kingdom, the education statistics since the nation joined in 1973 have only
increased, with a greater number of college graduates and higher retention rates in
schools. If education standards have been increasing, it would follow that support
would increase as well, but it has not. The second theory examined is wealth per
capita. The theory suggests that the more money an individual makes, the more
they would be able to capitalize on the European common market. The United
Kingdom has a very middle of the pack GDP per capita. By the theory this
should put them in the middle of the EU27 (the 27 current member states of the
EU) as far as support goes, but they are much lower than most.
The Silent Revolution theory deals with materialist vs. post-materialist
values. Materialist nations are ones that are more concerned with political and
economic stability, while post-materialist countries have more stability and can be
concerned with issues such as having the individual’s voice heard in politics and
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protecting the freedom of speech. Materialist countries tend to support the EU
more than post-materialists because the EU pushes egalitarian policies that more
benefit the materialist nations. The problem with this theory is that as with any
other social science, it is very uncertain and the correlations and results are
difficult to test for. The last of the theories is that of political partisanship. The
theory argues that citizens will support and follow the views of the leaders of the
political party they identify with. The parties in the UK are as divided as the
population is concerning EU membership, so there is no single position to
support. Also, there is Euroskepticism in the parties which could be imparted
onto the citizens. The kind of data I examined for this could not provide a
definitive answer.
Lastly for this question, I argue that the reason support for the EU in the
United Kingdom has always been lower is a question of history. First, the United
Kingdom had the largest empire the world has seen in recent history, and quickly
going from a large empire to a member state in a supranational institution has a
negative effect on their opinion of membership. More convincing than this,
however, is the experience of the United Kingdom in World War II that sets it
apart from the rest of the member states. The United Kingdom was the major ally
nation in Europe, with France falling early on. Also, she came out of the war less
demolished than the rest of Europe, and in a better financial state. Aside from
this, the United Kingdom learned a different lesson in the war than the rest of
Europe. France and Germany seemed to learn that cooperation was the only
means to prevent future conflict and secure a solid future in Europe. The United
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Kingdom learned that they did not need to rely on other nations for security, or for
anything. This is what sets the nation apart as far as support goes. Of course the
nation would be skeptical of joining the other European nations in an institution
the UK did not feel it needed.
As for the second question, I look at the changes in the European
institutions since their founding in the 1950s to the present. Europe began as a
loose economic cooperative effort with a goal of a single common market. Since
then, the EU has grown to also include social and political policies that are
outside of its original intentions. I argue that this is a major deterrent for the
United Kingdom from supporting the EU because the EU as it is now is not an
institution that the nation would want to be a part of.
I end with looking at the future of the United Kingdom in Europe. As
with the union on the whole, the future is difficult to predict given the current
economic crisis and more and more countries disapproving of the EU. I do not
believe that the United Kingdom would soon or ever leave the European Union
because it could not compete with the union’s market. This work is significant
because it gives a foundation for what is going on in the United Kingdom in
regard to Europe and looks towards predicting the future of the UK’s
membership.
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